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THE COURT: Before we begin the conference, I wanted to say to the participants before you speak during the conference, please identify yourselves so that the court reporter will know precisely who is speaking.

During the conference, if you mention things by name, please spell the proper names so the court reporter can capture that accurately. And also be mindful during the conference that only one person can speak at a time so that the reporter can capture everything that you want to say clearly.

So let's begin. This is Actava TV, Inc., et al. v.

Joint Stock Company "Channel One Russia Worldwide", et al., 18

CR 6626.

Will plaintiff's counsel please make your appearance.

MR. BUTTERFIELD: This is Toby Butterfield.

Your Honor. I'm appearing for plaintiffs herein, and I believe my colleagues, also representing plaintiffs, are on the line as well. Toby Butterfield, T-o-b-y B-u-t-t-e-r-f-i-e-l-d, of Moses & Singer.

MS. CASTANARO: Good afternoon, Judge Fox. This is Valeria Castanaro, C-a-s-t-a-n-a-r-o.

MR. ROSENBERG: Your Honor, this is Michael Rosenberg, also for the plaintiffs.

MS. TSUTIEVA: This is Diana Tsutieva, also for the plaintiffs, of Foley Hoag, last name spelled T-s-u-t-i-e-v-a.

THE COURT: Will defendants' counsel make an

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MR. DOWD: Good afternoon, your Honor. Raymond Dowd of the Dunnington law firm. And with me on the line is --

MR. ROWLEY: This is Hardin Rowley for defendants from Dunnington.

MR. KHAN: And Akbar Khan with the Dunnington law firm on behalf of the defendants.

THE COURT: This conference is to address matters raised by a correspondence beginning with the correspondence appearing at docket entry number 137.

Among the things that were raised in the correspondence was the ability or, rather, authority of defendants' counsel to represent one of the entities, the Channel One entity.

So let's address that matter first, and I'll turn to defense counsel because the plaintiff is challenging whether an authorization that existed, a power of attorney, had expired and therefore Channel One is not any longer represented by counsel. Of course a corporate entity cannot appear pro se. And if it isn't represented by counsel, it defaults in the action.

So what information can be shared to arrest the concern of the plaintiffs that there is no representation presently of Channel One by defense counsel.

MR. DOWD: Your Honor, this is Raymond Dowd. We are

in the process of obtaining an updated power of attorney from Channel One Russia.

THE COURT: When will that be affected?

MR. DOWD: We expect in the next couple of weeks.

Right now we've had the COVID crisis which has set everybody back in communications, but we expect to have that forthwith.

THE COURT: That gives me some concern because the plaintiffs wrote about this some time ago, not just yesterday, and flagged this as an issue. So it appears, based upon what you're saying, that your power has run out and that Channel One is not now represented.

MR. DOWD: I don't think a formal power of attorney is necessary in New York to represent a party. Under the doctrine of apparent authority, an attorney coming in saying that they have authority is generally enough.

We have taken the plaintiffs' concerns under advisement and are in the process of getting updated powers of attorney which we've done in the past and had them renewed without any problems.

It just seems it's a rush in procedure to give

time-limited powers and then renew them from time to time. So

I don't think it's a New York requirement that every counsel

have a power of attorney.

We do have an underlying retainer agreement that authorizes us to represent, and we were covered by the power of

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attorney for all the actions we took up until that time. So I

think under the doctrine of apparent authority that the Court

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should be reassured.

THE COURT: Of course apparent authority can be challenged. But let me hear from plaintiffs' counsel on this score.

Thank you, your Honor. This is Toby MR. BUTTERFIELD: Butterfield. We remain very concerned because of the news we discovered last year and brought to the Court's attention that Channel One is in not one but two different litigations with Kartina Digital GmbH, which is also a defendant.

We just about a week ago finally received for the first time information from defendants' counsel about those litigations which concern that they are existing in Russia and in Germany.

We're doing our best to try and understand what the nature of those litigations between the defendants are. But it seems plain to us that the delay in confirming that Channel One is still authorizing Mr. Dowd's firm to defend it in this case must be connected to this under these disputes.

The other piece that seems troubling to us is that the power of attorney that Mr. Dowd's firm provided was, on its face, not for the defense of this case. It was for the pursuit of the underlying case, which is an issue in this litigation against all the defendants.

That is not the only problem because the prior power of attorney was in place for several years but expired at the end of 2019. Actually, the one that the Dunnington firm sent to the Court said it was expiring on December 31, 2016.

They've shown us in discovery another one that expired at the end of 2019, but then the extension that Mr. Dowd referred to only lasted for a couple of months. So since the end of February, I believe, there has been a lack of apparent authority. And I'm not hearing from Mr. Dowd that he is in regular communication with the people who are empowered to issue this power of attorney.

And as Your Honor noticed, this issue has been before us since long before the appearance of the COVID-19 pandemic which shut down the regular business operations.

So we continue to be very concerned about this and concerned that we are in the unfortunate position of pursuing our case without it being clearly demonstrated that Channel One is represented herein and that Mr. Dowd is authorized to speak and take action in this case on its behalf which would of course compromise the integrity of the proceeding.

THE COURT: Well, as I indicated earlier in the conference, if a corporate entity is not represented, it may find itself in a default situation. So of course I'm not here to give Channel One any legal advice or any other party to the action.

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The power of attorney has lapsed. It hasn't been renewed. What language a new power will have I guess remains to be seen, but it puts Channel One in a somewhat precarious position it seems to me.

MR. DOWD: We will communicate that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me turn to another matter that was raised, and that is the ability of in-house counsel,

Mr. Lezhnev, and outside counsel, Ms. Tsutieva, to have access to documents that are exchanged during the pretrial discovery phase of the action.

The protective order that the parties negotiated and presented to the Court provides for in-house counsel and outside counsel to review documents. That's clear. And of course anyone getting access to the confidential documents exchanged must safeguard them and ensure that they're used for this litigation.

So if that is the case, as it appears from a plain reading of the protective order, that both in-house and outside counsel can look at documents, I was somewhat curious about why the defendants, having negotiated such language for a protective order, seem now to balk at having these two attorneys be privy to materials exchanged.

Mr. Dowd?

MR. DOWD: Your Honor, if I may defer to Mr. Rowley on this point.

THE COURT: Very well.

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MR. ROWLEY: This is Hardin Rowley. Judge Fox, you made a good point about the negotiations of the protective order. I negotiated those terms with Mr. Butterfield, and he did not disclose Ms. Tsutieva's involvement.

If we had known that, we would have asked for a carve-out for her in particular. That's the main issue. We only learned about her in their privilege log that was produced in December 2019.

I negotiated the protective order in May 2019. And her proximity to Mr. Tsoutiev, the principal of these entities and one of the plaintiffs, is a concern of ours. And we actually proposed amending the protective order to plaintiffs' to create sort of tiers of access, and we haven't received a response.

THE COURT: During your negotiation, did you ask plaintiffs' counsel to identify every attorney who would be covered by the agreement?

MR. ROWLEY: No. I relied on his representations.

THE COURT: Did he represent or present to you a list of every attorney who would be representing the plaintiffs in this action?

MR. ROWLEY: No. I relied on who had filed a notice of appearance and his firm generally.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Butterfield, do you want

to be heard?

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MR. BUTTERFIELD: Yes, your Honor. This is a baseless accusation against Ms. Tsutieva, to suggest that she would compromise the confidentiality of information that she gets subject to the protective order.

She had not entered a notice of appearance at the time of the negotiation of the protective order, and that doesn't make any difference really as to whether — the plaintiffs are entitled to select counsel of their choosing.

She's counsel at a very well-known firm in Washington D.C. There is no support for the suggestion that she would somehow violate the protective order. There is no accusation that she has violated the protective order. So I strongly object to the other side, the defendants' counsel, trying to prevent us from acting in accordance with the protective order.

Finally, this idea that these materials are somehow competitively sensitive doesn't make any sense for reasons we've exchanged in written correspondence with the defendants' counsel, and we're going to challenge the attorneys' eyes only designation.

It doesn't make sense either that there is any competitive threat because Actava TV is, as we all know, no longer in this business. So that's my position, your Honor.

The other accusations or veiled suggestions, most of which I'm not going to address because I think they're a little

ridiculous things. So I'm going to rest on that, your Honor,

MR. ROWLEY: Just one point. We produced to

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and not spend more time on it.

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THE COURT: Do you want to be heard further?

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plaintiffs a trademark registration filed by Mr. Lezhnez in

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2019 that said they were still in business doing this.

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don't know what is Mr. Butterfield's basis for that statement.

MR. BUTTERFIELD: The whole premise of this lawsuit is

THE COURT: Nothing in the correspondence suggested to

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that the company is no longer streaming and its business has

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been destroyed.

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me that there has been any attempt by plaintiffs' counsel,

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including Ms. Tsutieva, to breach the confidentiality of

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anything that's been exchanged.

capacity other than as counsel.

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order that was presented to me. There is no indication in any

The parties negotiated the terms of the protective

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of the correspondence or anything that has been said during

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this conference that suggests that she is not providing legal

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services; that she's doing work other than that in some

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So the privilege log stands as it is. It allows both

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the in-house and outside counsel to review materials, and I see

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no reason to deviate from that at this juncture.

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Let me turn now to the matter of the privilege log or

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logs. There are two for the Kartina entity and one for the Channel entity. Exemplars of materials that are the subject of the controversy over the privilege log provided by the defendants were sent to me for in-camera review. They have been reviewed.

The types of documents were placed into three categories: Category A, the Kartina log covering a period March 2016 to 2017. Those are communications involving defense counsel; category B, also a Kartina log covering a period January 2018 through September 2018; and the last category, category C, a Channel log of various communications.

With respect to the category A documents, based on the review, the in-camera review, I see no reason to require those documents to be disclosed. The privilege that was asserted, attorney-client privilege, appears to cover those materials. So that is why I conclude there is no reason to disclose them.

With respect to the category B documents, those communications appear to address bills or invoices for legal services. And such invoices and bills are not covered by the attorney-client privilege. The Second Circuit has made that clear in several different cases. So those materials can be disclosed. They're not protected by privilege.

The category C materials, these are Channel log communications. The in-camera review persuades me that they are covered by attorney-client privilege and need not be

something, let me know now. Otherwise, that will conclude our business today.

MR. DOWD: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. BUTTERFIELD: Your Honor, the issue of the categories A and C, I'm a little unclear whether your Honor's conclusion is based in part on the claims by the defendants that there is a common interest privilege that allows them to continue to maintain the privilege, although Kartina and Channel One are party to the communications. And if that's the case, I would like to be heard.

THE COURT: That is the case, in part.

MR. BUTTERFIELD: The problem that we have, your Honor, is that we've been learning piecemeal, because of the defendants' refusal to provide any discovery about the dispute between these different defendants, as to what that dispute concerns.

But what we have discovered is that Channel One has been claiming for more than a year that Kartina itself is a pirate who is sending out unauthorized streaming video of Channel One's to its subscribers.

The dispute appears to be based in part on a financial dispute, an argument by Channel One that Kartina isn't paying its bills for streaming that content. And therefore, that's the reason why these cases exist.

And in that situation, we don't believe that the

common interest privilege is applicable. And certainly from the time that that dispute arose, the common interest privilege can't survive when the parties are in litigation with each other.

The very recent disclosure of any of the details of these cases mean that we weren't in a position to provide more information to you, your Honor. But we have got some publicly available reports, as well as the defendants' interrogatory responses.

And for that reason, although it may have appeared, based on the selection of particular exemplars provided to you by defendants' counsel, that there is a common interest privilege, we believe, if it existed, to the extent it existed, it's been destroyed as demonstrated even by the terms of the engagement letter that the Dunnington firm provided to your Honor which warned Kartina at the outset that if there were additional proceedings under which Dunnington appeared for and represented Kartina, an additional engagement letter, a joint defense, or prosecution agreement with any counterparties might be required — as far as we're aware, there are no such documents — and that if there was a conflict of interest between the parties, then Dunnington would no longer be able to continue to act for everybody.

And despite the fact that these disputes do exist,

Dunnington has continued to represent them. So we would like

an opportunity to put that evidence before your Honor.

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We don't want to burden your Honor with a lot more discovery disputes. There have been enough already. But these compilations we believe go to the heart of the issue that we are seeking redress for.

The communications must not be just between the represented parties, but they must be in furtherance of the joint defense. And we've got nothing to suggest that any of these parties explicitly retained Dunnington to defend this case. And now we've got the doubt as to whether Channel One, if it even authorized it to act, continues to do so.

So we'd like to put a targeted motion before your Honor explaining and showing the details that we think are very troubling as to the dispute between Channel One and Kartina and explain why that shows that whatever common interest defense privilege might have existed for communications with counsel in furtherance of the defense of this case previously, that is no longer the case.

THE COURT: In the correspondence that came to me, you did raise this matter, not necessarily in the detail that you just did and that you suggest you might, if given an opportunity to submit more on this particular point.

So it was a consideration of mine when I reviewed the exemplars, the plaintiffs' position that there is now some tension between Kartina and Channel One and other defendants

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that may have to be considered in determining whether the attorney-client privilege protected any of the attorneys that were referenced in the log.

But let me hear from defense counsel.

MR. DOWD: Yes, your Honor. This is Raymond Dowd.

Basically there has been a dispute that arose after the termination of the license agreement which postdated all of the events that we're discussing here.

So we think that if this were teed up in a joint discovery letter where Mr. Butterfield put his side together and we put our side together, it would tee it up for your Honor to rule on and we could respond in detail to these allegations.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BUTTERFIELD: I thought we'd gone through that process. But if that's what your Honor wants to do, we can do that. We thought that that was the point of our initial letter.

We'd hoped that we might be able to are resolve these issues or that the dispute between the parties, between Channel One and Kartina, might somehow get resolved or that Channel One might reaffirm its authorization to the Dunnington firm to act herein.

But those things haven't happened, and now we're coming up on depositions. So we'd really like to get a proper ruling, your Honor. I think another premotion letter is not

necessarily going to provide your Honor with a record that you
would want to have in order to see the evidence, the enclosures
and the discovery actions that we have now finally obtained
from Mr. Dowd that describe how broadly this dispute between
the defendants goes.

THE COURT: As I indicated, I was aware of the plaintiffs' position from the correspondence that came, and I considered that in determining whether the privilege existed or did not exist. And I came out as I did and explained to you moments ago my position on what should be disclosed and what should not be based on the privilege asserted by the defendants.

I'm not interested -- as Mr. Butterfield suggested, I might not be, I'm not interested in having the parties churn out a lot of paper covering turf that has already been covered.

So I'm not inclined to receive another writing because I've considered the position of the plaintiff as set forth already in the correspondence in analyzing the dispute over whether privilege existed and materials should be properly withheld by the defendants.

So I have given you my view on that, having considered the plaintiffs' argument that an existing controversy or a new controversy involving Kartina means that there isn't the alignment of interest and so forth.

MR. BUTTERFIELD: Your Honor, if I may. This is

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Good

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day.